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Civil Procedure
By HOWARD W. L'ENFANT*
I. JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENTS
In Davis H. Elliot Co. v. Caribbean Utilities Co.,' a Vir-
ginia corporation filed a diversity action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky against a
British West Indies corporation and three Kentucky citizens
who were shareholders and officers of the defendant corpora-
tion. The claim against Caribbean Utilities Co. arose out of its
failure to reimburse the plaintiff for expenses incurred pur-
suant to a termination agreement, while the claim against the
individual defendants was for inducing the corporation to
breach its contract with the plaintiff. In 1970 the parties had
entered into a contract calling for the plaintiff to construct
electric transmission lines for the corporate defendant on
Grand Cayman Island. The plaintiff sent the contract proposal
to the defendant's managing director and general counsel at his
Lexington, Kentucky address. The proposal was accepted in
Lexington by the corporation's vice managing director. A dis-
pute arose concerning the plaintiff's performance under this
contract, and the officers of both companies met in Lexington
to work out a termination agreement which ultimately formed
the basis of the plaintiff's action. The defendant corporation
was served under Kentucky's long arm statute, 2 and its motion
to quash service of summons was granted on the ground that
it did not transact sufficient business in Kentucky to make it
amenable to service of process. The Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed, rendering a decision that is worthy of comment
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B. 1963, University of Notre Dame;
LL.B. 1966, Louisiana State University.
1 513 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1975).
2 Ky. REv. STAT. § 454.210 (Supp. 1974) [hereinafter cited as KRS]:
(1) As used inthis section, "person" includes . . . a corporation . . . who
is a nonresident of this Commonwealth.
(2)(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts
directly or by an agent, as to a claim arising from the person's:
1. Transacting any business in this Commonwealth. . ..
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
because it is the first case interpreting this provision of the long
arm statute.
Since this was a diversity case, the federal court was
required to construe the state statute as it thought the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals would.3 In doing so the court observed
that, ordinarily, questions of in personam jurisdiction involve
a two step inquiry. First, did the state legislature authorize the
courts to exercise jurisdiction under the facts of the particular
case? (i.e., does the statute apply to this particular nonresi-
dent?) Second, if so, does the exercise of jurisdiction violate
due process?4 These steps are merged, however, if the state
legislature has authorized the courts to assert the fullest juris-
diction permitted by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the "transact-
ing any business" provision of the Kentucky long arm statute
was intended to confer such authority, thus giving Kentucky
courts the broadest jurisdiction over nonresidents possible
under the due process clause.5 The court based this conclusion
partially on the fact that one express purpose of the 1968
amendment to the long arm statute was to give Kentucky
courts broader jurisdiction than was granted by the former
statute, which had grounded jurisdiction on the "doing of busi-
ness."6 The court also noted that identical statutory language
in other jurisdictions has been interpreted to extend jurisdic-
3 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e). See, e.g., In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc.,
466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972); Velandra v. Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d
292 (6th Cir. 1964); Smartt v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., 318 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1963).
513 F.2d at 1179.
Id. at 1180-81. See note 2 supra setting forth the relevant portion of KRS §
454.210, the Kentucky long arm statute.
6 Ky. AcrS ch. 141, § 1 (1946), as amended KRS § 271.610(2), provided, in part:
"Any foreign corporation that does business in this state . . . shall by such doing of
business be deemed to have made the secretary of state its agent for the service of
process. . . ... (emphasis added). The preamble to KRS § 454.210 (Supp. 1974) states,
in part: "WHEREAS, remedy cannot presently be had against those persons in our
Courts due to their non-residence within the Commonwealth." Ky. AcTs ch. 46 at 152
(1968). KRS § 454.210 was interpreted as being broader than the previous statute in
Etheridge v. Grove Mfg. Co., 415 F.2d 1338 (6th Cir. 1969) but was not applied to the
facts in that case because the court did not find any intent on the part of the Kentucky
General Assembly to make it retroactive. The statute became effective June 13, 1968,
while in Etheridge the accident occurred on September 20, 1966, and the suit was filed
on September 19, 1967.
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tion to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause.7
Having made this determination, the court found that the
due process clause imposes three requirements on the exercise
of jurisdiction: (1) The defendant must purposefully avail him-
self of the privilege of acting or causing a consequence in the
forum state; (2) the cause of action must arise from the defen-
dant's activities in the state;' and (3) the defendant's acts or
their consequences must have such a substantial connection
with the forum state as to make the exercise of jurisdiction
reasonable.' The defendant corporation argued that the first
requirement had not been met because the transactions relat-
ing to the termination agreement had no realistic impact on
Kentucky commerce, and furthermore, it was not reasonably
foreseeable that Kentucky would be affected when the agree-
ment was made. The court rejected this argument, characteriz-
ing it as artificial and narrow in that it equated "commercial
impact" with the narrower concept of financial gain or loss.'
The judges reasoned that failure to honor a contractual obliga-
tion incurred in Kentucky had effects on the general conduct
of business within the state which were real, although not read-
ily quantifiable. The court also concluded that a significant
portion of the corporation's affairs, including routine transac-
tions, contract negotiations, and corporate decision making
were carried on in Kentucky. Even though these corporate ac-
tivities were intended to produce benefits in the British West
Indies, this did not mean "in logic or law. . . that they had
I See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382(A)(1): "Transacting any business in this
state" was interpreted as extending jurisdiction to the full constitutional limits in In-
Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(a)(1971): "The transaction of any business within this State"
was interpreted, along with the other provisions of that section, as extending jurisdic-
tion to the full extent permitted by the due process clause in Nelson v. Miller, 143
N.E.2d 673 (IIl. 1957). This interpretation was dictum because jurisdiction was based
on the "tortious act" provision of that statute. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(b)(1971).
Of course, the interpretations of similar statutes by other states are treated as
persuasive authority by Kentucky courts. See Conner v. Parsley, 234 S.W. 972 (Ky.
1921).
1 This limitation is also found in the Kentucky statute. KRS § 454.210(2)(b)
states: "When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a claim
arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him."
1 513 F.2d at 1181.
10 Id. at 1181-82.
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no impact on the commerce of the Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky."" As to the remaining two requirements, the appellate
court found that the cause of action arose out of the defendant's
activity in Kentucky, and that the defendant had failed to
demonstrate that maintaining the action in Kentucky would
"offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' "12
Elliot is an important case not simply because it is the first
interpretation of the "transacting any business" provision of
Kentucky's long arm statute, but more importantly because
the court chose to equate the scope of the statute with the
constitutional boundaries set by the due process clause. This
is a proper interpretation which hopefully will be adopted by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals. Had the court attempted to
define what "transacting any business" means apart from the
requirements of due process it would have faced a difficult, if
not impossible task. A liberal construction of the "any busi-
ness" language could have resulted in granting the statute a
broader reach than the fourteenth amendment permits. For
example, literal application of "transacting any business"
could extend jurisdiction to a claim arising out of a transaction
involving a single business letter mailed to or from Kentucky.
Alternatively, a conservative interpretation of the statutory
language could have limited jurisdiction more narrowly than
the due process clause demands. The court's only interpretive
guide, apart from the statutory language itself, was that the
long arm statute was obviously intended to permit Kentucky
courts greater jurisdiction over nonresidents than was possible
under the earlier "doing business" statute.'3 Although less
business activity is required to establish in personam jurisdic-
tion, the long arm statute does not indicate how much less.
Thus, consistent with the statutory language, the court could
have conservatively construed the statute as granting less juris-
diction than the due process clause permits. By interpreting
Id. at 1182.
12 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The Supreme
Court in International Shoe was quoting from Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1941).
11 See notes 6 and 7 supra.
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the statute in terms of the due process requirements, Kentucky
courts are granted the fullest permissible jurisdiction, which is
clearly what the General Assembly intended by the broad sta-
tutory language." The due process clause demands that a de-
fendant's contacts with a state be such as to make the exercise
of jurisdiction fair and reasonable, and while deciding what is
fair in a given case is not easy, it is at least an attempt to
answer the right question."
A word of caution must be voiced with respect to the due
process analysis used in Elliot. An earlier Sixth Circuit case,
Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc.,'6 had
stated:
[B]usiness is transacted in a state when obligations created
by the defendant or business operations set in motion by the
defendant have a realistic impact on the commerce of that
state; and the defendant has purposefully availed himself of
the opportunity of acting there if he should have reasonably
foreseen that the transaction would have consequences in
that state.' 7
This was the basis for the defendant's arguments in Elliot that
it could not be subjected to jurisdiction in Kentucky because
its activity had no impact in the state, and it was not foreseea-
ble that it would have any impact at the time it entered into
the agreement. As was noted earlier, the court rejected the
argument because it erroneously equated commercial impact
with economic gain, finding that there had been a real, al-
though not readily quantifiable impact on Kentucky com-
merce. What the court should have done, however, is reject the
test stated in Southern Machine for when a nonresident has
transacted business or availed himself of the opportunity of
acting in a state, as an unnecessary narrowing of the due pro-
cess test. There is a danger that courts in other cases might use
the "commercial impact" test of Southern Machine as modi-
fied by Elliot, in place of the broader standard for due process
laid down by the United States Supreme Court. In Hanson v.
See id.
See Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930).
" 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968).
7 Id. at 382-83.
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Denckla,'8 the Supreme Court articulated the requirement of
"purposeful activity" in order to correct the tendency of some
courts to equate the "minimum contacts" test of International
Shoe Co. v. Washington'9 with the test for determining if suit
had been filed in a convenient forum. In Hanson the Court
stated that the due process requirements "are more than a
guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litiga-
tion."2 Regardless of how minimal the burdens of litigating in
a particular forum may be, "it is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. ' 2'
Applying this standard to the facts in Elliot, it seems clear
that the defendant corporation freely availed itself of the op-
portunity of acting in Kentucky: Three of its principal officers
were located in Lexington; Lexington was given as its mailing
address; the original contract proposal was accepted in
Lexington and the termination agreement which was the basis
for the suit was negotiated in Lexington. The corporation freely
chose to conduct its affairs in Lexington, and it seems fair to
require it to litigate in Kentucky when a claim results from
those activities. By contrast, under the "economic impact" test
of Southern Machine, it is more difficult to assert jurisdiction.
The court is reduced to saying that the breach of an obligation
incurred in a state has an impact on that state which is real
but not measurable. It is understandable that in wrestling with
the uncertainties of the due process limitations on in personam
jurisdiction, courts will attempt to give it more precision, hence
the appeal of a "commercial impact" standard. But in doing
so, they can easily lose sight of the Supreme Court's standard
for due process with respect to in personam jurisdiction:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defen-
dant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
Is 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
19 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
20 357 U.S. at 251.
21 Id. at 253.
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not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'22
II. VENUE
In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Nantz, 23 the plaintiff re-
covered damages from the assignee of a conditional sales con-
tract for the wrongful repossession and invalid sale of a truck
purchased under the sales contract. On appeal the defendant
argued that the trial court erred in overruling its motion to
dismiss the action for lack of proper venue. The defendant, a
Delaware corporation which regularly conducts business in
Kentucky and which had appointed a resident agent for service
of process, 24 contended that venue was proper in Jefferson
County where its process agent resided or in Laurel County
where the contract was made and where the repossession and
sale took place. 25 However, the plaintiff had acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant under the Kentucky long arm
statute,2 6 which permitted him to file suit in Leslie County
where he resided. 27
The Court of Appeals held that venue under the long arm
statute was proper whenever the statutory requirements were
met, even though other methods of obtaining jurisdiction were
available .2 Thus, long arm jurisdiction may be obtained over
2 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
2 516 S.W.2d 840 (Ky. 1974).
24 The defendant corporation had appointed the agent pursuant to KRS § 271.385
(1971) which was repealed and replaced by KRS § 271A.540, .555, .565 (Supp. 1974).
2 The defendant argued that KRS § 452.450 controlled venue. That statute
provides in part:
[An action against a corporation which has an office or place of busi-
ness in this state, or a chief officer or agent residing in this state, must be
brought in the county in which such office or place of business is situated or
in which such officer or agent resides; or, if it be upon a contract, in the
above-named county, or in the county in which the contract is made or to
be performed; or if it be for a tort, in the first-named county, or the county
in which the tort is committed. (emphasis added).
24 KRS § 454.210.
KRS § 454.210(4) provides: "When the exercise of personal jurisdiction is au-
thorized by this section, any action or suit may be brought in the county wherein the
plaintiff resides or where the cause of action or any part thereof arose."
2 516 S.W.2d at 842. See KRS § 454.210(5), which provides: "A court of this
Commonwealth may exercise jurisdiction on any other basis authorized in the Ken-
tucky Revised Statutes or by the Rules of Civil Procedure, notwithstanding this sec-
tion."
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any foreign corporation, regardless of whether the corporation
has a resident agent for service of process, so long as it is a
nonresident of the Commonwealth within the meaning of the
statute.
Although the statutory language is certainly susceptible of
such a construction, the Court's interpretation seems contrary
to both the legislative intent and traditional notions of venue.
It is fundamental that the residence of the defendant deter-
mines venue;2" this principle has been expanded to provide for
venue where the claim arose because the latter location is
usually convenient for trial. This pattern is reflected in Ken-
tucky Revised Statutes § 452.450 [hereinafter cited as KRS]
which provides that venue for resident corporations must be
where the corporate office or agent is located or where the claim
arose. When the defendant is a nonresident, the traditional
basis for venue (his residence) is obviously inapplicable, but
venue is still proper where the claim arose, and the residence
of the plaintiff also becomes a proper place for trial.30 A foreign
corporation with a resident agent should be treated as a resi-
dent, not a nonresident; jurisdiction should be based on where
the resident agent is served, and pursuant to KRS § 452.450,
venue should be in the county in which the resident agent
resides or in which the claim arose.' Only where such service
is not possible should the long arm statute and its venue provi-
sions be applied.
Ill. AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS
Can a plaintiff who has brought a timely action against a
defendant amend his complaint, after the statute of limitations
has run, to assert a claim against the same defendant in a
different capacity? When presented with this question in
Smiley v. Hart County Board of Education,32 a divided Court
of Appeals held that such an amended complaint was proper.
The plaintiff's son had died after falling into an excavation
29 See Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 MICH. L. REv.
307, 315 (1951).
: KRS § 452.450.
11 See note 25 supra.
32 518 S.W.2d 785 (Ky. 1975).
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pit while on his way to a high school football game. 33 The plain-
tiff brought a wrongful death action against Branstetter Hard-
ware, Inc., which in turn filed a third party claim for indemnity
or contribution against the Hart County Board of Education
and the board members in their capacities as board members.
The plaintiff filed an amended complaint against the third
party defendants, naming the board members in their capaci-
ties as board members and then, after the statute of limitations
had run,3 tried to file an amended complaint against them in
their individual capacities. The trial court refused to allow the
second amended complaint and granted summary judgment in
favor of the board and the board members. The Court of Ap-
peals upheld the entry of summary judgment on the grounds
of sovereign immunity but ruled that it was error not to allow
the second amended complaint.
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 15.03 [hereinafter cited
as CR] provides that a claim asserted in an amended com-
plaint will relate back to the date of the original filing if it arose
out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth in the
original pleading. The rule further provides that an amend-
ment changing a party against whom a claim is asserted will
relate back only if: (1) The claim arises out of the conduct,
transaction or occurrence originally set forth; (2) the party to
be brought in knew about the action within the statutory per-
iod for bringing the action and would therefore not be preju-
diced in maintaining his defenses on the merits; and (3) he also
knew or should have known that he would have been named
originally except for a mistake concerning the identity of the
proper party.
In Smiley the amendment could not have related back and
would have been untimely under the statute of limitations if it
had been treated as changing the party against whom the claim
was asserted, because the board members had no reason to
believe that the original complaint had omitted them in their
individual capacities due to a mistake on the plaintiff's part as
to the identity of the proper parties. It is clear that the plaintiff
1 The accident occurred on November 14, 1969.
31 The second amended complaint naming the board members individually was
filed in January, 1972.
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sought to amend to keep the defendants in the suit in their
individual capacities only after the defendants had filed a mo-
tion for summary judgment on the grounds of the sovereign
immunity of boards of education and their members. If, on the
other hand, the amended complaint in Smiley is considered to
be simply the addition of a claim, then it should relate back,
because it arises out of the same occurrence which was set forth
in the original pleading. The purpose of the relation back provi-
sion is to defeat any defense based on the statute of limitations
when the court is satisfied that the defendant was given ade-
quate notice of the claim through the original complaint .3 The
rationale for relation back is that the original complaint in-
forms the defendant of the transaction, conduct or occurrence
which is the basis for the plaintiff's action, and accordingly,
puts him on notice as to all potential claims arising out of the
transaction, conduct or occurrence in question. It seems rea-
sonable to conclude, as the Court of Appeals did, that the
defendants, having been sued as board members, received suf-
ficient notice of potential claims against them in their individ-
ual capacities arising out of the same occurrence to allow the
amended complaint to relate back and thereby escape the stat-
ute of limitations.3 6
IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A recent decision by the Court of Appeals could create
uncertainty as to the proper standard to be used in ruling on a
motion for summary judgment. In Roberson v. Lampton" the
plaintiff-passenger brought an action to recover for personal
1 See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 323 U.S. 574 (1945); Welch v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 466 F.2d 1344 (5th Cir. 1972); Barthel v. Stamm, 145 F.2d 487 (5th
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 878 (1945); Green v. Wolf Corp., 50 F.R.D. 220
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Meltzer v. Hotel Corp. of America, 25 F.R.D. 62 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
- This result finds support in Taormina Corp. v. Escobedo, 254 F.2d 171 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 827 (1958), in which the plaintiff was allowed to amend
his complaint to name the partnership as defendant after having brought suit against
the individual partners. The Court permitted the amendment to relate back. In Smith
v. Guaranty Serv. Corp., 51 F.R.D. 289 (N.D. Cal. 1970), the plaintiff was allowed to
amend his complaint to name one defendant as an active wrongdoer after originally
naming him only as a passive stakeholder. Again, the amendment was deemed to relate
back.
37 516 S.W.2d 838 (Ky. 1974).
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injuries against the owners and drivers of three vehicles that
had been involved in the multi-vehicle accident in which she
was injured. After some discovery had been completed, the
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of two of the
defendants. The Court of Appeals reversed, noting that no tes-
timony had been obtained through discovery from one of the
defendants or from the plaintiff's husband, who had driven the
car in which she was a passenger. Therefore, the Court rea-
soned that it was premature to conclude, as the trial court had,
that the plaintiff could not produce the evidence necessary to
prove causation at trial. The Court held: "The true purpose of
a summary judgment is to terminate litigation when, as a mat-
ter of law, it appears that it would be impossible for the respon-
dent to produce evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in
his favor and against the movant."35
The precise nature of the Court's ruling in Roberson is not
altogether clear. If it is a case in which the plaintiff was unable
to offer evidence to oppose the defendants' motions because she
had not completed her discovery, then the trial court should
have either denied the motions or delayed ruling on them until
the plaintiff had completed her discovery.39 If this was the basis
for the Court's decision, then the case is correctly decided and
not particularly noteworthy. However, the Court's failure to
refer to CR 56.06,1o in conjunction with the general language
used in the opinion, allows the conclusion that the Court de-
cided the case by applying the general standards for granting
a summary judgment. If this interpretation of the decision is
correct, then the Court's opinion merits some comment.
If, indeed, Roberson does involve the application of a gen-
eral standard for summary judgment, the Court seems to be
saying that a motion for summary judgment shall not be
granted unless the movant convinces the trial court that it is
- Id. at 840.
" Ky. R. Civ. P. [hereinafter cited as CR] 56.06 provides:
[S]hould it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that
he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order
a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken
or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
11 See id.
19751
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impossible for the opponent of the motion to produce evidence
at trial sufficient to support a judgment in his favor.' This,
however, is not the proper standard for ruling on a motion for
a summary judgment. The motion is designed to look beyond
the issues as framed by the pleadings to determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to justify a trial on those issues. 2
There is no need for a trial if one party lacks the evidence to
support his allegations. 3 The movant supports his motion with
evidence tending to show that there is no genuine issue of fact,
and that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.4  His
opponent must oppose the motion with enough evidence to
establish that a genuine issue of fact exists. 5 The movant does
not bear the responsibility for proving that it is impossible for
the opponent to produce sufficient evidence at trial; rather, the
opponent bears the responsibility of coming forward with his
own evidence to defeat the motion." On this point Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56(e) [hereinafter cited as Federal Rule]
provides:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and sup-
ported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment,
if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 7
As stated earlier, if Roberson is read narrowly as an appli-
cation of CR 56.06, then there is no problem. But if it is read
more broadly as establishing a new and much more stringent
' On this point the Court cited Conley v. Hall, 395 S.W.2d 575 (Ky. 1965).
42 See, e.g., Tuley v. Heyd, 482 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1973); Ando v. Great W. Sugar
Co., 475 F.2d 531 (10th Cir. 1973); Gevedon v. Grigsby, 303 S.W.2d 282 (Ky. 1957).
1 See, e.g., Rowland v. Miller's Adm'r, 307 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1957).
" See, e.g., New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Allen Co., 446 S.W. 2d 278 (Ky. 1969);
Roberts v. Davis, 422 S.W.2d 890 (Ky. 1968); Gevedon v. Grisby, 303 S.W.2d 282 (Ky.
1957).
11 See, e.g., Gullett v. McCormick, 421 S.W.2d 352 (Ky. 1967); Tarter v. Arnold,
343 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. 1960); Townsend v. Gulf Interstate Gas Co., 308 S.W.2d 793 (Ky.
1957); Continental Cas. Co. v. Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co., 281 S.W.2d 914 (Ky.
1955).
11 See cases cited at note 45 supra.
17 Although Kentucky does not have a similar provision there is authority for this
position in Kentucky cases. See cases cited at note 45 supra.
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test for granting a summary judgment, then the results will be
unfortunate, because the motion for summary judgment will no
longer be able to play its useful role of eliminating cases in
which the opponent has insufficient evidence to create a genu-
ine issue of material fact. One solution might be to adopt Fed-
eral Rule 56(e) in order to clarify the burdens that rest on both
the movant and the opponent of a motion for summary judg-
ment.
V. DIRECTED VERDICT AND INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL
Civil Rule 41.02(2) provides that at the close of the plain-
tiff's case the defendant "may move for a dismissal on the
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown
no right to relief." This motion serves a function in a nonjury
case similar to that of a motion for directed verdict in a jury
trial, in that it allows the defendant to attack the plaintiff's
case before putting on his own.48 Because of this similarity it is
easy to assume that both motions are decided by the same
standard. This was the position asserted by the plaintiff in
Morrison v. Trailmobile Trailers, Inc.,49 a nonjury case in
which the trial court granted the defendant's motion for a di-
rected verdict at the conclusion of the plaintiff's presentation
of evidence, based on its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court was in error,
since he had presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of
fact. The Court of Appeals noted the confusion, first on the
part of the defendant in filing a motion for directed verdict,
and then on the part of the plaintiff in arguing that all he had
to do was present sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact.',
In a jury case the jury is the trier of fact, and the motion
for directed verdict tests whether the evidence is sufficient to
allow a jury composed of reasonable people to find the facts in
favor of the opponent of the motion.' In ruling on the motion,
the opponent is given the benefit of every reasonable infer-
" See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 67 F. Supp. 397 (D.D.C. 1946),
rev'd on other grounds, 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
" 526 S.W.2d 822 (Ky. 1975).
' Id. at 824.
5, See CR 50.01; Lee v. Tucker, 365 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. 1963); James v. England,
349 S.W.2d 359 (Ky. 1961).
1975]
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ence. 2 But in a nonjury case the judge is the trier of fact, and
the motion for dismissal at the close of plaintiff's case tests
whether the trial judge has been persuaded by the plaintiffs
evidence. In reaching his decision the trial judge weighs the
evidence, 3 resolves conflicts54 in it and decides on the basis of
the preponderance of the evidence.55 The plaintiff is not enti-
tled to any special inferences. 6 If the judge is convinced that
the defendant is entitled to a judgment on the evidence pre-
sented, he then makes the appropriate findings of fact and
enters judgment accordingly. If the motion is denied, the de-
fendant puts on his evidence. Additionally, if the motion is
granted and the plaintiff appeals, the standard of review is not
whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of fact
in favor of the plaintiff-appellant, but whether the findings of
fact by the trial judge were "clearly erroneous" in view of the
evidence presented.59 Hopefully, the very careful opinion by the
Court of Appeals in Morrison will prevent any future confusion
between the motion for a directed verdict and the motion for
an involuntary dismissal in a nonjury case.
51 See, e.g., Campbell v. Olive, 424 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1970); Alden v. Providence
Hosp., 382 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
13 See Weissinger v. United States, 423 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1970).
" See United States v. Bartholomew, 137 F. Supp. 700 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
See Emerson Elec. Co. v. Farmer, 427 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1970); Ellis v. Carter,
328 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1964).
11 See Emerson Elec. Co. v. Farmer, 427 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1970).
57 See, e.g., Trask v. Susskind, 376 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1967).
1 CR 41.02(2) expressly provides that the defendant makes the motion to dismiss
"without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted."
11 CR 52.01. See Morrison v. Trailmobile Trailers, Inc., 526 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Ky.
1975). See also Woods v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 480 F.2d 644 (10th Cir. 1973);
Robinson v. MV Merc Trader, 477 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1973); Klein v. District of
Columbia, 409 F.2d 164 (D.C. Cir. 1969); B's Co. v. B.P. Barber & Associates, Inc.,
391 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1968).
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